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The Human Side of Commercial Law 
Daniel Keating* 
Commercial law can be a complex and technical subject. Every 
course that I teach has a code with lots of different rules that interact 
in various ways—some of them quite complicated. But that’s not the 
focus of my discussion. Instead, I want to address here the softer side 
of commercial law. You are, after all, witnessing the work of an 
English and Psychology major from a small liberal arts college in 
Monmouth, Illinois. The parts of commercial law that I want to focus 
on today harken me back to my days as an undergraduate, when I 
studied the fascinating subject of human behavior both as a formal 
science and through great literature. 
In fact, as I prepared this discussion, I thought about the advice of 
one of my Psychology professors at Monmouth College, who used to 
urge his students before they gave a class presentation on a technical 
subject: “Explain it in a way so that your grandparents from 
Oquawka can understand it.” I didn’t realize until after I had 
graduated that there really is a small town in Illinois called Oquawka, 
but the utility of my professor’s advice had already been imprinted on 
my brain. He wanted us to present our topic in a way that was 
accessible even for the uninitia ted, and to present our thoughts with 
short simple prose rather than with technical jargon. I suspect this 
advice is just as valuable for law students as it is for a chair 
installation speaker on a Thursday afternoon. 
I chose today’s topic because it is the human side of commercial 
law which first sparked my interest in the subject and which has 
sustained my research throughout my career. As I look back over the 
issues on which I have written, I see recurring illustrations of the 
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same human characteristic. An optimist would describe that common 
thread as the human capacity for hope in a better future. A cynic 
would call it the human tendency toward self-delusion and 
procrastination. The truth lies probably somewhere in the middle. 
Let me give you three concrete examples of what I mean and 
describe in each case how the human side of commercial law played 
itself out in each context. These three examples illustrate that it is not 
enough to understand the legal rules without an appreciation for 
human motivations and characteristics that can end up dominating the 
law that is on the books. First, there is the problem of retiree medical 
benefits in bankruptcy. Second, I will discuss the issue of 
underfunded corporate pension plans. And third, I will discuss some 
recent empirical work that I have done involving the “battle of the 
forms” in the sale of goods. 
The first article that I published as a law faculty member was 
about retiree medical benefits in bankruptcy. 1 I chose this topic 
because it was the subject of one of the last memos I wrote as a 
bankruptcy attorney for the First National Bank of Chicago. As a 
lawyer for First Chicago, I was focusing on some very technical 
issues that the bank cared about as a lender to companies that 
occasionally filed for bankruptcy. In the late 1980s, Congress had 
amended the Bankruptcy Code to include a new section that would 
give retiree medical benefits a special priority in Chapter 11 
bankruptcies.2 What First Chicago wanted to know was whether this 
priority would undermine its own position as a creditor. 
As a practitioner, I had a responsibility to my client, the bank, to 
answer the very focused issue that was set out for me. As an 
academic, though, I had the luxury of considering the bigger picture, 
and in particular the human dimensions of this issue. What I 
discovered was a trail littered with evidence of the human tendencies 
toward procrastination and self-delusion. The problem of retiree 
medical benefits in the late twentieth century, I quickly realized, was 
a classic example of a broader phenomenon known as deferred 
maintenance. 
 
 1. Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in 
Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161 (1990). 
 2. See 11 U.S.C. 1114 (1994). 
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The way most retiree medical benefit programs work is that a 
company will promise its current workers that if they stay with the 
company a certain number of years, then the workers will receive free 
or significantly subsidized health benefits when they retire from that 
company. It is a way to induce workers to remain with the same 
company even if a slightly higher base salary can be found elsewhere. 
The problem with retiree medical benefits is that there is no 
requirement that they be funded in advance by the company that 
promises them. That is, there is nothing that forces a company to set 
aside money now to account for the fact that current workers are 
today accruing the right to collect significant benefits in the future. 
Retiree medical benefits have historically been handled on a cash 
basis—the company pays the benefits for current retirees as they 
come due, but does not save additional money now for future benefits 
that will necessarily accrue over time. If the number of retirees and 
workers remains constant and medical costs don’t change, paying 
these benefits on a cash basis would not produce a deferred 
maintenance problem. However, when the number of retirees grows 
relative to the number of workers and medical costs outpace 
inflation, then you have the makings of a real mess. 
The problem is particularly acute in manufacturing industries 
where the ratio of younger workers to older workers keeps shrinking. 
It is not difficult to see, then, how the problem of retiree medical 
benefits stems from the very human tendency to procrastinate if we 
are given the chance. At a rational level, the managers of these 
companies must know that these deferred obligations will eventually 
come due, but, on the other hand, why worry about the future when 
there are today’s bills to pay? 
Indeed, some academics have argued that one of the key 
justifications for having a consumer bankruptcy law is that it 
recognizes and accounts for the natural human proclivity to believe 
that somehow things will be better in the future than they are today.3 
Thus, as we run our consumer credit facilities to the limit and 
respond to additional invitations for credit cards from increasingly 
eager credit-card purveyors, we conveniently look past the possibility 
 
 3. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh -Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 1393 (1985). 
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that something bad may happen to us in the future. And sadly, the 
unaccounted for future misfortune often requires a greater financial 
margin than we have left ourselves with. 
In exploring the origins of deferred maintenance, there are 
actually two different human tendencies at work. The first is the 
belief that somehow in the future things will be better than they are 
now and that everything will eventually work itself out. “Why fund 
retiree benefits now when our future cash flow will likely be 
adequate?” There is also, however, a second mental trick at work, one 
perhaps more disturbing than the first: “Well, if eventually things 
don’t work out, it won’t be my problem—by that time, I’ll probably 
be with a different company. Why make hard choices now for 
someone else’s benefit in the future?” I have to confess that one of 
my personal pet peeves is when people are able to externalize the 
costs of their own bad decisions. But that, unfortunately, is one of the 
by-products of the deferred maintenance phenomenon.  
Nor are academics or government leaders immune from the trap 
of self-delusion that leads to deferred maintenance problems. Some 
of our most esteemed academic institutions on both coasts of the 
country suddenly found themselves faced with deferred building 
maintenance in the hundreds of millions of dollars for which they had 
set aside no adequate reserves.4 The hard lessons that these 
universities learned in a very public way helped to spur other 
academic institutions to a more realistic policy about setting aside 
funds for the inevitable deterioration of physical facilities. On the 
government side, the current social security conundrum is a classic 
example of politicians refusing for too long to account in an honest 
way for the increasing pool of retirees coupled with a relatively 
smaller work force who are paying into the social security system. 
When I was studying the retiree health benefits problem, what was 
perhaps most fascinating to me was not the human foibles at the 
corporate level that created the mess in the first place. Rather, it was 
the superficial Congressional solution that itself only postponed the 
day of reckoning. In July of 1986, the LTV Steel Company filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and informed its 68,000 retirees that the 
 
 4. See, e.g., Martin Van der Werf, Yale’s Ambitious Renovation Program Tops Any 
Undertaken by University, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Oct. 20, 2000. 
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company would cease to pay the medical benefits that they had all 
been promised for their lifetime of service to the company. 5 Led by 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, whose state included many LTV 
retirees, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to give retiree 
medical benefits a special priority status in Chapter 11 reorganization 
cases.6 This amendment increased the chances that the retirees would 
be the fortunate creditors who would be paid from the limited assets 
remaining in the company. 
As it turned out, this band-aid approach was good enough to 
handle the problem in this particular bankruptcy case, but the solution 
left for another day similar risks faced by retirees from other 
companies. Because the new legislation applied only to Chapter 11 
reorganization cases, it would end up affecting only a fairly small 
percentage of the total cases where companies become insolvent. 
Although retirees now receive a special priority for their medical 
benefit claims in Chapter 11 cases, they do not receive a preferred 
position in Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidations or in nonbankruptcy 
dissolutions. 
Furthermore, the new legislation ignores the zero-sum nature of 
bankruptcy. If retirees are suddenly receiving a higher priority, then 
that means other unsecured creditors are going to be in a relatively 
worse position. And while no one will likely shed any tears when 
banks such as First Chicago receive a lower payout on their loan 
recoveries, other more sympathy-evoking creditors such as tort 
victims must now also face the prospect of a diminution in their 
recovery from a Chapter 11 debtor. 
The Congressional solution, then, was itself a great example of the 
human tendencies of self-delusion and procrastination–only this time 
practiced by our federal government. The hard choice would have 
been to tackle the real problem behind crises like we saw in LTV: 
namely, to address the failure to pre-fund the corporate promise to 
provide medical insurance to retirees. That choice, however, would 
have created short-term political costs from angry business owners 
 
 5. Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1986).  
 6. Retiree Benefits Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. 1114 (1994)). 
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who suddenly would have lost the ability to defer maintenance on 
their retiree medical benefits. So Congress did the human thing and 
chose the course that was cheap and painless in the short run, but 
costly in the long run. 
It didn’t take long for bankruptcy judges to experience first-hand 
how deficient this superficial solution really was. In a case that was 
heard just two years after the enactment of the retiree medical 
benefits legislation, a Chapter 11 company had literally no assets that 
were left to distribute beyond those on which there were already 
existing security interests.7 The judge in that case received a written 
statement from one of the sponsoring senators of the retiree benefits 
legislation. That senator urged the judge to force the continued 
payment of retiree benefits in this case, notwithstanding the lack of 
any unencumbered assets in the bankruptcy estate. The obviously 
exasperated judge ignored the senator’s plea and noted in his opinion 
that “short of printing money, there is no way to see that all claims 
are paid in full.”8 
A second example of the human side of commercial law played 
itself out in the area of underfunded pension plans. You can think of 
the underfunded pension problem as a closely related cousin to the 
retiree medical benefits mess. The difference between the two is that 
with underfunded pension plans, Congress actually bit the bullet and 
decided to require pre-funding as a condition to a company gaining 
favorable tax treatment for its pension plan. 9 In addition, Congress 
created a federal insurance agency that would serve as a safety net to 
take over payments to retirees where companies failed to make their 
promised pension payments.10 All in all, it sounded like this was a 
legislative scheme that faced the pension underfunding problem 
head-on and did not fall prey to the human tendency to put off hard 
decisions. 
Unfortunately, the fine print here left too many loopholes in which 
the humans in charge of the funding decisions could still practice 
 
 7. In re GF Corp., 115 B.R. 579 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990), vacated in part, 120 B.R. 421 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990). 
 8. Id. at 585.  
 9. Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. 
REV. 65, 68-71. 
 10. Id. 
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deferred maintenance. In particular, there were actuarial assumptions 
that could be easily and legally manipulated;11 there was a transition 
issue in which companies could defer pre-funding for employees who 
had already accumulated past-service credit by the time that a 
company’s program began;12 and there was the phenomenon of 
“agency capture,” in which the folks from the government who were 
in charge of monitoring a company’s pre-funding were just too 
friendly with the company managers who were supposed to 
implement those requirements.13 
What began to happen in practice, then, was that companies 
experiencing financial problems would offer their employees 
significant increases in their future pension payments in lieu of a 
larger increase in wages. Wages, of course, have to be paid with 
present cash. Increased pensions could be paid later, and even the 
pre-funding requirements gave financially struggling companies 
ample room for payment over time. Once again, LTV Steel was the 
poster child for all that could go wrong with this regulatory scheme, a 
scheme that still left plenty of room for the human proclivity to 
procrastinate. By the time LTV filed for bankruptcy, its pension 
programs were underfunded by two billion dollars.14 
My third and final example of the human side of commercial law 
comes from recent work that I have done in the sale of goods area. 
There is a provision in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
that deals with a situation known as the “battle of the forms.”15 Here 
is how a battle of the forms case arises: Buyer sends a purchase order 
to Seller in which Buyer offers to purchase a stated quantity of a 
certain kind of goods from Seller. Buyer’s purchase order form 
includes terms that are customized to the particular order, such as the 
type of goods, the quantity of goods, and the time and place of 
delivery. Buyer’s form also includes some standard pre-printed 
language that is not specific to this deal, such as Seller’s warranties 
(which Buyer specifies in a very expansive way) and Buyer’s 
 
 11. Daniel Keating, Chapter 11’s New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 803, 809-13. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Keating, supra  note 9, at 78. 
 14. Id. at 66. 
 15. U.C.C. § 2-207. 
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remedies if Selle r breaches (which are also quite generous to Buyer). 
When Seller receives Buyer’s purchase order, Seller responds 
with an acknowledgment form of its own. The deal-specific terms are 
the same as Buyer’s form, such as type of goods, quantity and 
delivery terms, but the pre-printed terms are quite different: Seller’s 
warranties are all disclaimed, and Buyer’s remedies are minuscule. 
After Seller sends its form to Buyer and Buyer does not object to the 
form, Seller ships the goods and Buyer sends its payment. Everyone 
is happy for the moment. Buyer gets the goods it wants, and Seller 
makes another sale. But occasionally something goes wrong with the 
goods and suddenly Buyer is forced to look to the warranties and 
remedies under the contract. The question is: Whose warranties and 
remedies apply—those on Buyer’s form or Seller’s form? 
The battle of the forms scenario is fascinating from a 
psychological perspective. In a sense, it is a situation that turns 
standard contract law on its head. The battle of the forms is 
essentially a deal in which the two parties recklessly, if not 
knowingly, consummate a sale of goods without having settled on all 
of the terms. And while one could argue that every contract is 
incomplete at some level, what distinguishes the battle of the forms 
case is that these contracts are most often incomplete at very 
fundamental levels. Left unsettled are issues like warranties, 
remedies, and other matters that no one could pretend were beyond 
the contemplation of the parties at the time of formation. 
A second distinction between the battle -of-the-forms situation and 
the typical incomplete contract is that with the battle of the forms, 
each side has specifically proposed something for the open term so 
we know exactly what both parties wanted for that term. So why 
don’t the parties sit down and settle these issues in advance? Once 
again, I attribute it to the tendency we all have to put off unpleasant 
things if we can. Note that the issues being left unsettled are all non-
immediate terms, things that the parties figure they can worry about 
later, or worse yet, that someone else can worry about later. But if 
and when later comes and something goes wrong with the deal, the 
parties or their successors are left to wind their way through a 
complicated statutory morass that sets up default terms for the parties 
that may or may not be optimal for their particular deal. 
In a series of interviews with business people and in-house 
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lawyers, I learned some interesting things about the way sales 
transactions are actually conducted in practice.16 I also learned that 
even modern technology cannot overcome certain human traits such 
as the desire to postpone difficult negotiations whenever possible. In 
many sales of goods transactions today, buyers and sellers no longer 
exchange paper forms but instead place orders via e-mail through a 
system called Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). In order to conduct 
business using EDI, the two sides have to first sit down and draft a 
single Trading-Partner Agreement that is supposed to include all of 
the terms and conditions for future sales between the two parties.17 
One might imagine that when two parties are going to engage in a 
series of transactions over time, they would have the appropriate 
incentives to spend the time to negotiate even non-immediate terms 
of the sales contract such as warranties and remedies. What was 
fascinating for me to learn, however, is that in many of these EDI 
arrangements, the two parties simply will put in the agreement that 
“Seller’s standard warranties and remedies will apply and Buyer’s 
standard warranties and remedies will apply.”18 They include this 
term even though both sides know full well that the two side’s 
warranties and remedies are very different from one another. Yet the 
desire to avoid making hard choices in the short term, combined with 
the ability to postpone the day of reckoning on these non-immediate 
terms, can lead both parties to take this easy out. Somehow, they 
choose to avoid negotiating to conclusion on such key terms even in 
the face of such an obvious opportunity as the drafting of the 
Trading-Partner Agreement. 
I suppose I could stop right here and conclude with the thought 
that I have loved studying commercial law not only for the challenge 
of the complex statutes that it presents but also for the human element 
behind these technical laws. Yet, now that I have identified a 
common thread that runs through so many of the major commercial 
law problems I have studied, I feel as though I ought to offer at least 
some brief observations on what lessons we can learn from the 
 
 16. Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH . L. REV. 2678 
(2000).  
 17. DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 57-58 (1998). 
 18. Id. 
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pattern I have discerned. Let me suggest three quick thoughts on the 
implications of that pattern for commercial law reformers. 
First, if you set up a system in which human actors can postpone 
pain, they probably will. Therefore, you need to create statutory 
structures that include immediate consequences for the failure to 
account for future contingencies. If there are not immediate 
consequences, the problem will only be postponed and aggravated. 
Second, for the bankruptcy law reformers, always remember that 
bankruptcy, like much of a life, is a zero-sum game. Therefore, if you 
create new bankruptcy priorities with no pre-funding requirement, 
you are necessarily reducing the relative priority of some other, 
perhaps worthier, claimant to the assets of the bankruptcy estate. The 
Bankruptcy Code, which began as an attempt to distribute limited 
assets in an even-handed way, has increasingly become tilted toward 
whatever special-interest lobby can produce the biggest campaign 
contributions.  
And finally, commercial law reformers should not assume that 
technological advances in how business is conducted will solve 
problems that have their roots in the human condition. Technology 
creates various efficiencies in commerce, but it cannot by itself 
overcome certain human tendencies possessed by all, such as 
avoiding hard choices whenever we can and favoring the path of least 
resistance in the short term whenever that path is made available to 
us. 
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